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Abstract—The Human Event Repository and Analysis (HERA) 
system has been developed as a tool for classifying and recording 
human performance data extracted from primary data sources.  
This paper reviews the process of extracting data from simulator 
studies for use in HERA.  Simulator studies pose unique data 
collection challenges, both in types and quality of data measures, 
but such studies are ideally suited to gather operator performance 
data, including the full spectrum of performance shaping factors 
used in a HERA analysis.  This paper provides suggestions for 
obtaining relevant human performance data for a HERA analysis 
from a control room simulator study and for inputting those data 
in a format suitable for HERA. 
I. INTRODUCTION
The Human Event Repository and Analysis (HERA) system 
[1] was developed as a tool for classifying human performance 
data extracted from primary data sources such as event reports.  
The HERA system provides a comprehensive taxonomy for 
human performance, with a particular emphasis on those factors 
that shape human performance at nuclear power plants. HERA 
serves as a framework for cataloging human performance, 
providing a worksheet based classification scheme and a 
database for storing and trending findings across multiple data 
sources.
HERA records a variety of performance shaping factors 
(PSFs) based on good practices in human reliability analysis 
(HRA) [2].  As a representation of safe and unsafe human 
activities, HERA entries provide qualitative indications of the 
relationship between human performance and context.  HERA 
also provides a potential quantitative basis for computing 
frequentist human error probabilities or for updating existing 
probabilities in a Bayesian statistical framework.  HERA allows 
the computation of a denominator of total actions contained in 
the HERA database, such that the human error probability may 
be considered a function of the number of unsafe actions 
contained in HERA divided by the total number of actions.  The 
more activities that are recorded and the more representative 
such activities are, including routine and successful human 
activities, the more complete the HERA representation is. 
The requisite large data basis for frequentist estimation is, 
however, hindered by the lack of detailed human performance 
data in many event reports.  Event report data are well suited to 
the timeline approach used by HERA but may fail to provide a 
complete and nuanced account of human performance during 
the event [3].  This lack of detail is largely due to the 
retrospective nature of event reporting.  Event reports typically 
document those human performance considerations known to 
have a causal connection to specific outcomes in the event [4].  
They do not typically document the full range of human 
activities, including positive human actions that may have 
indirectly contributed to a safe event outcome.  To capture all 
activities in addition to reportable deficits in human 
performance, it may be necessary to assemble an event 
inspection team [5].  A careful and costly reconstruction of 
operator activities by an inspection team is not always feasible, 
nor is it always necessary, especially when the risk significance 
of an event is negligible. 
One data source that can consistently provide a complete 
snapshot of human performance is control room simulator 
studies.  Simulator studies present opportunities to compare 
actual crew performance to expected task performance or even 
procedural requirements and attempt to discern causes for any 
deviations. Control room studies such as those conducted at the 
HAlden huMan-Machine LABoratory (HAMMLAB) [6] 
provide insights into nuclear power plant control room crews 
when confronted with a variety of normal and off-normal 
scenarios.  Unique to such studies is the ability not only to 
record all crew interactions and communications but also to: 
x Manipulate the scenario and corresponding external 
PSFs (e.g., environmental factors, quality of the 
interface, number of simultaneous tasks, etc.); 
x Precisely assess performance measures (such as time 
to complete tasks) that clearly map to the PSFs used in 
HERA; and 
x Utilize additional measures such as crew self-
assessment of performance during the scenario. 
HERA includes provision for the input of simulator studies.  
However, the manner in which findings from simulator studies 
may best be input into HERA is not necessarily self-evident.  
This paper provides a brief overview of the differences and 
similarities between event and simulator study data.  This paper 
also provides suggestions for obtaining relevant human 
performance data for a HERA analysis from a simulator study 
and for organizing those data in a format suitable for input into 
HERA.
II. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SIMULATOR STUDIES AND 
EVENT REPORTS
A. Initiating Events 
A major difference between simulator studies and reportable 
events at power plants is that simulator studies need not 
necessarily encompass a negative plant state such as an 
initiating event—a perturbation to the steady state operation of 
the plant that potentially challenges plant control and safety 
systems.  Nor are simulator studies necessarily expected to 
demonstrate crew performance deficits.  It is possible to conduct 
a simulator study in which no initiating event and no discernible 
performance deficits occur.  Such routine and safe situations 
occur every day at operating plants.  But, because these 
operations never degrade below a minimum safety threshold, 
they are not reported.  Consequently, there are few extensive 
records of the routine but safe human actions at plants.  
Simulator studies represent the opportunity to record human 
performance during normal operations.  Such activities may 
prove important baselines against which operator performance 
in off-normal circumstances can be compared. 
For those simulator studies that feature negative plant states, 
it must be noted that these states are often triggered by the 
investigator.  For example, a simulated steam generator tube 
rupture (SGTR) may be artificially initiated by the investigator 
to gauge subsequent crew response.  For artificially initiated 
events, the focus of the study is not on the root cause of the 
initiator but on the crew’s post-initiator performance.  Safe post-
initiator crew performance is characterized by activities that 
address the unsafe initiator. 
B. Simulator Data Types 
Simulator studies pose unique challenges in terms of the 
types of data that are gathered.  Simulator studies are generally 
ideally suited to gather crew response time [7].  However, a 
simulator study must be carefully designed in order to record 
the data required for a comprehensive HERA analysis.  PSF 
data are not readily extracted from simulator data simply by 
virtue of the data coming from a controlled study.  Rather, the 
study should be designed to account for the data suited to 
HERA, and appropriate measures such as independent and 
dependent variables must be incorporated into the study. 
While it would be desirable to use data derived from a plant’s 
training simulator log files, such data do not automatically lend 
themselves to a full spectrum of HERA analysis.  In order to 
complete a HERA analysis, it is crucial to understand what 
factors were manipulated, what crew-related PSFs came into 
play, as well as the scenario outcome in terms of success or 
failure.  These factors are not automatically recorded in typical 
training simulator runs.  Extraction of such factors can prove 
laborious and time-consuming when not incorporated into the 
original study design. 
Braarud et al. [8] note measures that are used in HAMMLAB 
control room simulator studies.  These measures provide an 
example of the types of data needed to capture the complete 
human performance inputs favored for HERA coding.  Braarud 
et al.’s measures are listed below: 
x Open-ended crew interview 
x Operators’ PSF self-ratings and comments 
x Operator background questionnaire 
x Expert observer’s PSF ratings, comments and crew 
performance rating 
x Itemized activity log for the crew 
x Verbal protocol or commentary of crew activity by 
expert observer 
x Time-stamped simulator logs including all crew 
interactions with system 
x Audio and video of all crew members during the 
scenario
Any PSFs collected in a simulator study should, whenever 
possible, be aligned to those PSFs used in HERA.  Other PSFs 
may, of course, be used, but these should, as feasible, be 
mapped to the HERA PSFs for completeness and maximum 
compatibility. 
C. Simulator Study Timeline 
During HERA coding, an event report is deconstructed into 
an event timeline that chronicles positive and potentially 
negative human, plant, and contextual subevents at the plant.  In 
contrast, a simulator study does not necessarily produce a single 
timeline, as a scenario is typically tested using multiple crews 
that may experience different outcomes.  To facilitate 
comparison between crews performing the same scenario, it is 
important to construct an a priori timeline based on the different 
phases of a planned scenario.  Consider, for example, a study to 
detect and control an SGTR at a pressurized water reactor.  
Appropriate high-level tasks of these activities might include: 
x Detect and identify SGTR 
x Isolate steam generator (SG) 
x Cool down reactor cooling system (RCS) 
x Depressurize RCS 
x Terminate safety injection 
x Achieve pressure balance 
These phases could be further parsed into subtasks.  For 
example, to isolate the SG, the operators would need to isolate 
the faulted SG according to emergency operating procedures, 
set the steam dump atmosphere valve set point to the 
appropriate pressure level, and alert personnel and emergency 
organizations. 
Given the low human error probability for most control room 
tasks, each crew will ideally perform these tasks successfully as 
prescribed by the operating procedures.  Thus, the timeline for a 
simulator study may consist entirely of successful human 
activities (HSs in HERA parlance), which is less common in 
analyses of reportable events.  Naturally, there is also the 
possibility that certain simulator crews will fail to complete all 
required activities successfully or within prescribed time 
constraints.  Such actions may be recorded as unsuccessful 
human activities (XHEs in HERA).  In addition to such Boolean 
success/failure states, a control room or process expert may 
subjectively rate each task on a scale, providing a degree of 
success or failure.  In such cases, the expert should also provide 
specific comments to clarify the ratings, which may be used to 
help assign the PSFs for each task. 
Given the same scenario and phases across multiple crews, 
how should HERA analysts construct the scenario timeline?  
There are special considerations for simulator study data in 
terms of the level of task decomposition and the input of data 
from multiple crews. 
1) Subevent Granularity 
The granularity of the subevent decomposition is a reflection 
of the data collection goals.  Using the above SGTR example, 
the analyst may be interested in the detailed steps each crew 
takes to complete each task.  In such a case, the timeline will 
feature each task along with subtasks, each treated as subevents 
in HERA.  The analyst may cluster the subtasks together to 
indicate they belong to a single series of actions.  By clustering, 
the analyst elects to list the subtasks as separate subevents in 
HERA but then group them together for coding efficiency.  It is 
assumed that when subevents are clustered, they feature 
common characteristics and performance shaping factors that do 
not warrant separate detailed coding as subevents.  The HERA 
system provides functionality to support such clustering. 
Alternately, if the analyst is not interested in detailed task 
decomposition, he or she may elect high-level tasks 
corresponding to the main tasks but excluding the subtasks.  
These high level tasks correspond to the subevents in the 
timeline, without treating each subtask as a separate subevent.  
In other words, some subtasks may be purposefully omitted in 
order to provide a clearer timeline and avoid the need to cluster 
subevents.  This approach may be adopted, for example, when 
performing a HERA analysis based on Human Failure Event 
(HFE) cutsets in probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). 
Note that a priori clustering of subtasks as part of a single 
task or subevent is possible for simulator studies but not for 
event data.  Clustering for simulator studies reflects the 
controlled nature of the study design.  Event data must establish 
a clear performance pattern before being clustered.  Because 
simulator studies typically represent carefully controlled 
scenarios, it is uniquely possible to cluster subtasks prior to data 
collection on the basis of shared scenario or situational 
characteristics.
2) Input of Data from Multiple Crews 
Simulator data are usually the product of multiple crew runs 
over multiple scenarios, thus producing a wealth of data for 
possible inclusion in HERA.  Consider the SGTR example, 
decomposed to the primary task level presented earlier.  In a 
hypothetical study involving ten crews, all crews successfully 
detect and identify the SGTR, isolate the SG, cool down the 
RCS, and achieve pressure balance.  However, one crew fails to 
depressurize the RCS in the prescribed time, while another crew 
initially fails to terminate the safety injection (but eventually 
recovers and achieves pressure balance, albeit at a significant 
delay compared to other crews).   
This example reveals a particular nuance of efficiently coding 
simulator studies into HERA.  It is possible to model the actions 
of each crew separately and generate ten separate timelines with 
corresponding Part B worksheets.  This process would likely 
result in ten separate event entries, each with six subevents 
corresponding to the major tasks of interest in the SGTR.  
Without software assistance to duplicate event and subevent 
level information, coding would be particularly laborious, 
because manually entering nearly identical data records could 
prove unduly repetitive, while attempts to extract meaning of 
the separate crew entries would likely prove problematic 
without careful cross-referencing between crews and scenarios. 
To address this issue, HERA provides specific data fields that 
facilitate the categorization of simulator data.  In the HERA 
Overview Worksheet (Worksheet A), the analyst may indicate 
that the data are part of a simulator study.  Four text fields 
accompany the designation of a simulator study: 
x Experiment Information 
x Scenario
x Variant
x Crew
The Experiment Information field is used to provide a short 
description of the overall simulator study under investigation 
(e.g., “SGTR Complexity Study”).  Since each simulator run is 
treated as a separate event entry, it is the Experiment 
Information field that ties the different events together.  
Separate events that feature the same Experiment Information 
field are considered part of the same study.  The Scenario field 
is used to delineate groups of experimental manipulations, as 
required. The overall study might, for example, feature two 
scenarios, corresponding to independent variables that are 
manipulated (e.g., “Basic SGTR” vs. “Complex SGTR”).  
Further variations of the scenarios would be featured in the 
Variant field (e.g., “Clear Indicators” vs. “Misleading 
Indicators”).  Finally, the Crew field allows the analyst to 
record which crews correspond to each scenario and variant.  
Table 1 shows the concatenation of the levels of scenario and 
variant manipulations coupled with the crews tested in those 
scenarios. 
TABLE I. EXAMPLE SIMULATOR STUDY SCENARIO, VARIANT, AND 
CREW ASSIGNMENTS
Experiment SGTR Complexity Study 
Scenario Basic SGTR Complex SGTR 
Variant  Clear Indicators 
Misleading
Indicators 
Crew 1 – 10 1 – 5 6 – 10 
Note in the example that the scenario is a within-subject 
design, whereby all crews participated in both the “Basic 
SGTR” scenario and the “Complex SGTR” scenario.  The two 
variants of the “Complex SGTR” scenario are a between-subject 
design, whereby different crews participated in different 
experimental conditions.  According to the information in Table 
1, the overall study would consist of three separate timelines, 
corresponding to the Scenario and Variant combinations.  In 
other words, a separate set of HERA worksheets would be 
coded for each of the crews featured on the bottom line.  The 
total number of events coded would be 20, corresponding to the 
ten crews in the “Basic SGTR” condition and the same ten 
crews in the “Complex SGTR” condition, five crews each for 
the “Clear Indicators” and “Misleading Indicators” scenario 
variants.  
Rather than manually code data for each crew, the software 
version of HERA makes it possible to duplicate event data, 
including all subevents.  It may be useful to code the most 
typical crew first as an event and then duplicate that event, 
customizing the details of the event and subevent analysis to 
reflect the particular crew’s performance.  In the worksheet 
version of HERA, the analyst would need to code crews 
separately. 
Note that it is important not to attempt to aggregate data from 
multiple crews into a single event.  In order for proposed 
forthcoming HERA software data extraction features to function 
properly, it is necessary for there to be a complete set of records 
for all crews that were tested in a simulator study.  Aggregated 
data can lead to underestimation of performance frequency 
when the HERA software are used to trend across multiple 
events.  Proposed HERA software data extraction features 
would also provide tools to allow easy comparisons and 
summaries within an experiment, thereby obviating the need for 
manual aggregation of the data across crews. 
III. SIMULATOR STUDY PSFS
As discussed earlier, it is crucial for the simulator study to be 
designed in such a way that it is possible to collect the PSF 
information required by HERA.  In event reports, PSFs must be 
carefully weighed in the face of available reported data.  
Simulator studies afford the opportunity to collect all necessary 
data to assign the PSFs with a minimum of expert inference.  
It is useful to review the three types of simulator and 
simulation PSFs discussed in Boring [9].  In an event or 
simulator study, PSFs may be considered static conditions,
dynamic progressions, or dynamic initiators (see Table 2).  
These three PSF types are explained below. 
TABLE II. TYPES OF PSFS TO CONSIDER IN SIMULATOR STUDIES
Static Condition Dynamic Progression 
Dynamic 
Initiator 
PSFs remain 
constant across 
the events in a 
scenario.
PSFs evolve across 
events in a 
scenario.
A sudden change 
in the scenario 
causes changes in 
the PSFs. 
A static condition denotes a scenario or event in which the 
PSFs remain constant.  An example of such a PSF in HERA is 
“Fitness for Duty / Fatigue.”  Especially in the context of the 
relatively short duration of simulator study runs, there is 
typically little opportunity for fitness for duty or the fatigue of 
the operators to degrade during the course of the study.  
Physical injury or sudden emotional stress are also ruled out as 
possible effects on the operators’ fitness for duty during the 
simulator run.  Since this PSF is not expected to change during 
the simulator run, it is not necessary to monitor this PSF during 
the study.  (The exception to this guidance would be studies that 
specifically manipulate fitness for duty in some manner.)  It is 
helpful to take an initial measure of this PSF or to assign it a 
known value based on the investigator’s expertise.  This initial, 
static measure may then be used to pre-populate detailed PSF 
information across scenario subevents, thereby increasing the 
efficiency with which other information can be incorporated 
into HERA.  Unless there are significant situational or 
contextual changes during a scenario (such as caused by a 
dynamic initiator), the following HERA PSFs may typically be 
considered static conditions:  Experience & Training, 
Procedures & Reference Documents, Ergonomics & HMI, 
Fitness for Duty / Fatigue, Environment, and Team Dynamics / 
Characteristics. Communication may also prove to be a static 
condition for a well-seasoned crew that has developed 
significant cohesion and that does not include new members. 
Note that each of these PSFs may, in fact, change 
dramatically throughout a scenario.  An experienced and highly 
trained crew may encounter a novel situation for which they 
have minimal training and experience.  Quality procedures may 
fail to cover an unusual or unexpected plant state.  An overall 
effective HMI may suddenly give a misleading indicator.  A fit 
operator may gradually become fatigued.  Trusted systems in 
the environment such as lighting may fail.  Otherwise stable 
team dynamics may prove forfeit in the face of particularly 
stressful and complex events.  In a carefully controlled 
simulator study, such changes are most likely the result of the 
investigator’s manipulation of the scenario to trigger changes in 
the PSFs in order to measure their effects on crew performance.  
See the discussion below on dynamic initiators. 
A dynamic progression encompasses those PSFs that 
naturally change and evolve across the scenario.  These PSFs 
should be assessed or monitored regularly throughout the 
scenario to allow a mapping between the tasks (subevents) and 
PSFs.  “Complexity” is an example of a PSF that is expected to 
change throughout the course of the scenario.  As the scenario 
evolves, the operators are constantly required to monitor plant 
indicators and take appropriate actions.  Simultaneous tasks, 
ambiguity, simultaneous alarms, and other factors combine to 
vary the situational complexity throughout the operation of the 
plant.  The following HERA PSFs may in many cases be 
considered dynamic progressions:  Available Time, Stress & 
Stressors, Complexity, and Communication. 
In some cases, it may be appropriate to treat static condition 
PSFs dynamically, especially in particularly dynamic scenarios.  
Note that static condition and dynamic progression are not 
mutually exclusive categories.  The decision to treat a PSF as 
static or dynamic resides with the investigator or analyst and is 
a function of practical considerations in terms of the amount of 
recurring data collection that is required during the simulator 
study scenarios.  The delineation provided here serves as 
general guidance that is applicable to many scenarios. 
A dynamic initiator occurs when any PSF is altered by a 
sudden change in the simulator study scenario.  Almost any 
PSF, whether normally treated as static or dynamic, may 
respond to a sudden change in the scenario.  Consequently, 
following the introduction of an experimental manipulation, it is 
useful to monitor the status of PSFs.  For example, the 
introduction of a plant trip and the crew’s entry into emergency 
operating procedures is expected to alter the crew’s actions and 
mental activities dramatically.  The experimental manipulation 
has the potential to almost instantly change the PSF states that 
affect operator performance.  For example, entry into an 
emergency operating procedure almost instantly changes the 
Available Time (e.g., time may suddenly become limited), 
Stress & Stressors (e.g., stress may elevate), Complexity (e.g., 
complexity may increase), Experience & Training (e.g., training 
may not have covered the situation at hand), and Procedures & 
Reference Documents (e.g., procedures may not fully address 
the situation).  It may also alter Ergonomics & HMI (e.g., 
instrumentation may be affected by the situation), Work 
Processes (e.g., the novel situation may highlight new facets of 
work processes not covered by other situations), 
Communication (e.g., communication may degrade), and Team 
Dynamics / Characteristics (e.g., interactions may change in the 
face of an emergency situation).  In some cases, the dynamic 
initiator cause may be ascribed to a single PSF.  For example, a 
sudden loss of instrumentation or lighting would apply to the 
Ergonomics & HMI and Environment PSFs, respectively, and 
would have an almost immediate trickle-down effect to other 
PSFs.
Note that those PSFs that are deemed static conditions may 
be determined at one point in the study and left constant across 
subevents, unless there is a dynamic initiator.  Also note that it 
is not possible to assign static conditions for most event reports.  
The static nature of PSFs results from the carefully controlled 
nature of simulator studies.  In practice, of course, some PSFs 
found in event reports may prove static, but this can only be 
determined after careful assessment of the status of the PSF 
throughout the event.  Static and dynamic PSFs are coded 
identically in the HERA worksheets.  The difference between 
static and dynamic PSFs to the HERA analyst or the study 
investigator involves how often the PSFs are tracked and 
measured.  Static PSFs are not typically tracked throughout the 
scenario; dynamic PSFs should be measured regularly and 
repeatedly.
IV. TIPS FOR ENCODING SIMULATOR DATA IN HERA 
The previous sections of this paper outlined key 
considerations for capturing control room simulator study data 
with HERA.  This section provides a brief walkthrough of 
considerations pertaining to completing various parts of the 
HERA worksheets [10] for simulator data. 
A. Worksheet A, Section 1 (Plant and Event Overview) 
Primary Source Document Questions.  When a published 
summary of the simulator study is available, this should be cited 
appropriately and linked in the software database.  When no 
published summary is available, the cited source should denote 
the simulator name and date of study (e.g., “HAMMLAB 
Complexity Study, 2006, unpublished”). 
Plant Information Questions. To the extent appropriate, plant 
information should be captured including plant type, plant 
operating mode, and power level as modeled in the simulator.  
The “Other” field should be used to denote the degree to which 
the simulator is congruent with the crew’s “native” plant control 
room.  The less congruence there is, the more it is expected that 
the plant crew’s performance will deviate from performance 
norms.  Additional remarks regarding the fidelity of the 
simulator and the relationship between the simulated and native 
control room should be noted in Section 2 of the Worksheet. 
Event Overview and Affected Systems Questions.  Event 
information (particularly in terms of plant upset conditions) 
should be captured in these fields.  This information only needs 
to be as complete as the underlying simulation.  Where 
particular systems and functions are manipulated 
experimentally, these should be recorded.  The time should be 
recorded in real time to reflect any time-of-day considerations 
that may be present during the simulator run.  Proposed 
software tools in HERA would allow the analyst to switch 
between real time and elapsed time displays in the timeline. 
Simulator Study Questions.  As described previously, the 
essentials of the study design are recorded in terms of scenarios, 
variants, and crews.  Each scenario or variant that requires a 
different crew will receive a separate Overview Worksheet 
(Worksheet A) and accompanying Detailed Activity 
Worksheets (Worksheet Part B) for the scenario tasks or 
subevents. 
B. Worksheet A, Section 2 (Event Summary / Abstract) 
Section 2 is designed to contain an event summary or 
abstract.  From the perspective of recording the essential 
information of the simulator study, it is important that this 
section contains background information on the simulator type 
and configuration, including its similarity to the crew’s native 
control room; a clear expression of the purposes, hypotheses, 
and goals of the study; details regarding all experimental 
manipulations, including explanations of the scenarios and 
variants; a description of the crews who participated in the 
study; and a summary of study findings. 
C. Worksheet A, Section 3 (Index of Subevents) 
It is useful to create a timeline or index of subevents a priori 
according to the design of the control room study.  Typically 
scenario tasks are treated as subevents in the timeline.  Subtasks 
may be clustered under a common task and treated as clustered 
subevents.  As suggested earlier, simulator data may often 
contain only successful human activities (HSs).  Unsuccessful 
crew activities (XHEs) may be determined by outright errors, 
failure to complete tasks according to specified criteria (e.g., 
within time constraints), or expert judgment of performance.  
Plant states and contextual information (i.e., EE, XEQ, EQA, 
PS, or CI in HERA) may also be included to the extent 
appropriate to capture the nuances of the scenario.  Time should 
be recorded in real time, not as elapsed time since onset of the 
study. 
D. Worksheet A, Section 4 (General Trends Across Subevents 
/ Lessons Learned) 
This section encompasses trends and lessons learned across 
the scenarios.  Note that simulator study trends may not be 
causal in the same manner as for events.  In many cases, the 
study investigator may manipulate factors to test human 
performance under adverse conditions.  Thus, there is no 
implication of the crew or the plant conditions triggering 
adverse conditions.  In many cases, the only cause of the 
adverse conditions is the investigator’s experimental 
manipulation. 
E. Worksheet A, Section 5 (Human Subevent Dependency 
Table) 
This section features the Human Subevent Dependency 
Table.  This section may not be relevant to all simulator studies, 
especially for those simulator studies that have only successful 
human activities (HSs) in their timeline.  Dependency is only 
indicated for XHEs in HERA [3].  To the extent unsuccessful 
human activities are included in the simulator study timeline, 
dependency should be considered for simulator studies.  If the 
dependency link between XHEs is caused by the experimental 
manipulation and not specifically by the links in crew 
performance, these should be clearly noted in the comments 
section.  Simulator studies will typically involve the same crew 
performing actions close in time, which may be sufficient basis 
for assuming dependency.  Analysts may also wish to consider 
the extent to which PSFs co-occur across subevents as 
additional criteria for establishing dependence. 
F. Worksheet B, Section 1 (Personnel Involved in Subevent) 
This section allows the HERA analyst to record which 
personnel were involved in the scenario. Typical simulator 
configurations focus on control room crews only and do not 
include, for instance, auxiliary operators, engineering staff, etc.  
It is therefore expected that most simulator studies will only 
feature personnel found under the “Operations” heading. 
G. Worksheet B, Section 2 (Contributory Plant Conditions) 
This section handles conditions at the plant.  The HERA 
analyst should note which plant conditions are manipulated in 
the simulator scenario as well as which plant functions, systems, 
and components would be affected by the experimental 
manipulations. 
H. Worksheet B, Sections 3 and 4 (Positive and Negative PSF 
Details) 
Positive and negative contributory factors or PSF details call 
for expert knowledge about the interaction between the study 
scenarios, plant conditions, and the operators.  As with PSFs, 
PSF details may be considered static or dynamic and may be 
treated appropriately.  For static condition PSFs, it is typically 
sufficient for the study investigator and plant operations expert 
to evaluate the PSF details once across all conditions and for all 
crews.  For dynamic progression and dynamic initiator PSFs, 
details should be recorded across scenarios for each crew. 
It is useful to have an operations specialist who is trained on 
HERA definitions observe the live or recorded simulator runs 
for each crew and make expert ratings about the PSF details.  
To facilitate this process, it is possible to provide the observer 
an abridged HERA worksheet that only encompasses those PSF 
details deemed to be dynamic throughout the scenario.  An 
abridged worksheet for dynamic PSFs should, of course, later 
be merged with the data for the static PSFs. 
I. Worksheet B, Section 5 (PSFs) 
In HERA analyses based on event reports, the PSF details 
serve as the basis for selecting a PSF level.  This basis also 
applies to simulator study analyses, but the PSF details are not 
the only possible basis for the assignment of a particular PSF.  
The simulator study has additional detail available that may 
serve as evidence for the influence of a particular PSF.  For 
example, subjective ratings on PSFs by the crew and by expert 
observers may indicate the influence of a PSF.  Also, objective 
measures such as performance criteria, physiological measures, 
and simulator logs may indicate the influence of a particular 
PSF.  These information sources augment the PSF details and 
should also be considered in the overall determination of PSF 
assignment levels.  The overall use of such measures should be 
documented in the summary in Part A, Section 2.  The specific 
metrics used to establish a particular PSF should be fully 
documented in the comments section of that PSF. 
J. Worksheet B, Section 6 (Human Cognition) 
Phases of human cognition such as detection, interpretation, 
planning, and action are recorded in this section.  An analyst 
may wish to delineate overall tasks according to the constituent 
subtasks for the purposes of completing this section (e.g., a 
particular task may have subtasks separately related to detection 
vs. action, which may be treated as separate subevents).  The 
analyst should exercise expert judgment in the classification of 
the cognitive steps involved in each scenario task. 
K. Worksheet B, Section 7 (Error Type) 
This section denotes the error type and should be assessed for 
each crew and subevent according to the guidance in Chapter 2.  
Note that across crews, for the same subevent, it may be 
possible that some crews succeeded (causing the subevent to be 
an HS), while some crews did not meet the success criteria 
(causing the subevent to be an XHE).  This section should only 
be completed for those crews for which the subevent is 
classified as an XHE. 
L. Worksheet B, Section 8 (Subevent Comments) 
In this final section for general subevent comments, it is 
useful to paraphrase the overall performance findings of the 
task, particularly when crews differed from expected 
performance.  Any manipulated PSFs or other causal factors 
should be noted here as well. 
V. CODING FOR NON-OPTIMIZED SIMULATOR STUDIES
The preceding discussion focused on coding HERA for 
simulator studies that are optimized to HERA’s data collection 
format, particularly in terms of the collection of data for a full 
suite of PSF data.  Of course, many simulator studies are not 
optimized for HERA, particularly with regard to the extensive 
PSF information ideally required to complete the HERA coding.  
It is nonetheless possible to use the data from such studies.  
When using such data, it is important to note in the overall 
event summary (Worksheet A, Section 2) what measures were 
available in the study that helped complete the HERA analysis.  
Equally importantly, the data that were not available (such as 
PSF data that were not recorded in the study) should be 
indicated.  For unavailable data, fields denoting “not applicable” 
or “insufficient information” should be used, and comments 
should indicate that these areas were not available nor 
considered in the simulator study. 
VI. QUALITY ASSURANCE PROCESS GUIDELINES FOR 
SIMULATOR STUDIES
Quality assurance (QA) requirements for the analysis of 
simulator studies in HERA mirror requirements for the analysis 
of event reports [10]: Analysts should have proper training to 
understand and complete the HERA coding; analysts 
(potentially including the study investigator) should work 
together to complete the analysis and second-check the coding; 
it is important for the coding related to the simulator study to be 
externally reviewed. A key difference between simulator studies 
and event reports, however, is that a large part of QA in coding 
simulator studies takes place in the design and conduct of the 
study–before the study is actually coded into HERA. Important 
pre-coding considerations include: 
x Design of the study to capture the data fields necessary 
for HERA. It is especially important to develop 
suitable measures that correspond to the HERA PSFs. 
These measures should ideally not rely solely on 
observer judgment or crew self-assessment, which may 
fail to capture the true range of human performance 
due to inherent human scaling biases [11]. Objective 
measures should be employed whenever practicable. 
x Maximize the congruence between the crew’s native 
control room and the control room simulator used in 
the study. A failure to utilize a close approximation 
can result in poor crew performance (due to a lack of 
experience and familiarity with the novel control 
room) and poor study generalizability. When 
differences between the simulator and the native 
control room plant are present, it is advisable to 
provide training to the crew on the novel control room 
prior to testing in the study. To avoid fatigue as a 
factor on performance, training and testing should not 
be conducted back-to-back.  Although the surface 
features of the simulator interface may vary from those 
found in the native control room, issues of control 
room differences may be largely overcome by ensuring  
the functional similarity of the simulator and native 
control room interfaces [12].   
x Develop clear criteria for successful crew performance 
on each task.  By establishing guidelines such as what 
is considered an error and what amount of time is 
allowable to complete a task (in accord with plant 
procedural and regulatory guidelines), it is possible to 
eliminate the need for subjective classification of crew 
performance as successful or unsuccessful. 
x Ensure complete and accurate data gathering during 
the simulator runs. The integrity of automated data 
collection tools and the utility of observer judgments 
and subjective ratings should be pre-tested and 
reviewed during the course of simulator runs. A 
performance measure that fails to gather data in the 
intended way can compromise the completeness of the 
HERA analysis. 
During the extraction of simulator data into HERA, the 
HERA analyst should work closely with the study investigator 
to ensure the quality of the data input. The investigator should 
assume a prominent role alongside the analyst. The investigator 
is the main resource for constructing the event timeline and 
determining appropriate PSF data from the study. When the 
study investigator is not available, two or more analysts should 
work closely together in the construction of the timeline and the 
extraction of PSF data according to HERA’s general QA 
guidance. 
VII. OTHER APPLICATIONS OF HERA
The primary purpose of HERA is as a repository for data 
from event and simulator sources to support risk-informed 
decision making.  This purpose does not preclude the use of 
HERA for other purposes.  An example of a further application 
of HERA is in support of the ongoing empirical study of HRA 
methods [13].  This international study is designed to compare 
the findings of various HRA methods across the same scenario.  
This scenario is based on an SGTR study recently carried out in 
the HAMMLAB simulator.  HERA was used as a common data 
framework for capturing the full range of PSF details found in 
various HRA methods, thus enabling ready comparison between 
the methods.  As well, the predicted findings from the HRA 
methods, to the extent practicable, can be validated to those 
findings from the actual control room crews in the simulator. 
The empirical study of HRA methods is illustrative of other 
applications of HERA.  Because HERA provides a high-level 
taxonomy of positive and negative contributors to human 
performance, it can serve as a standardized data framework 
when it is necessary or desirable to conduct comparisons of 
different data sources. As demonstrated, HERA enables a 
comparison between the probabilistic framework of HRA 
methods and the empirical data of simulator studies.  Other 
comparisons between different data types are quite possible 
within HERA.  In addition, HERA provides the opportunity to 
capture diverse data in a standardized format, even when these 
data will not be utilized for comparative purposes. 
VIII. DISCUSSION
HERA has the capability to input data from both event 
reports and simulator studies.  This paper has provided a first 
look at the process of capturing and inputting simulator study 
data for HERA.  This process includes requirements for having 
as complete PSF details as possible, with a particular emphasis 
on the design of effective study measures.  This process also 
includes formatting the data in such a way as to allow seamless 
incorporation into HERA.  This two-pronged process, when 
carefully followed, affords the inclusion of a potentially 
significant number of successful crew activities from simulator 
studies, complementing data found in event reports.  The 
synthesis of these two data sources uniquely provides a 
comprehensive snapshot of human performance, opening the 
door for more comprehensive analyses of human reliability in 
nuclear power plant control rooms. 
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